

# COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XIV. No. 15.] LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1808. [PRICE 10D.

"The merit of the ministers in sending out this expedition, in their plan of operations, in their choice of a commander, and in every part of the enterprize, no man of a just mind, will, whatever be his sentiments in other respects, attempt to deny. They would, if the thing had failed, have been loaded with no small share of the blame; it would, therefore, be the height of injustice to withhold from them their share of the praise."—POLITICAL REGISTER, Vol. XIV. p. 386.

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## SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL.—This subject may now, until the makers of the Convention return home, receive its dismissal, every material question relating to it having been discussed, and having been pretty clearly decided in the public mind. It is settled, that the thing was, in itself, disgraceful to our arms; that it was, in its effects, injurious to our allies of Portugal in particular, and to those of Spain and Sweden; that it was insulting, to the last degree, to the Prince Regent of Portugal and to his faithful adherents; that there existed, not only no necessity for making it, but that obvious policy pointed out an exactly contrary course; and, lastly, that the blame is equally divided between Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Arthur Wellesley, the latter, if any difference, meriting the greatest share.—We have, however, to consider what share of blame attaches to the ministers, and particularly the war minister, for having made such appointments; and, I think, the words which I have taken for my motto, and which were written before any one had the smallest doubt of the final success of the expedition, will fully justify me in imputing to them no small share of blame.—It has always been the practice of the public to blame the ministers for the follies or vices of those whom they appoint to command; and, that this is generally just no one will deny; because, in a state of things, where there are so many temptations for them to seek, in such appointments, their own or their party's interest, in preference to that of the public, there ought to be some check upon them, which check is to be found only in that responsibility, which the public has a right to demand at their hands. Were there no blame, in cases of this sort, to attach to them, with what reason can we expect that they will ever make good appointments, unless we choose to suppose, that wisdom, courage, and integrity are inseparable from parliamentary interest? That every minister must wish to see his military and naval plans succeed is evident enough; but, the mo-

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ment any expedition is on foot; that is to say, the moment any lucrative and honourable appointments are to be made, that moment is he assailed with applications, backed by such arguments as are not to be treated with contempt, unless he choose to run the risk of being out voted, and of losing his place, his emoluments, and his power. This being the case, it is quite reasonable that there should be a check upon him, in this respect. He appoints, at last, whom he pleases to appoint; but, then, it being notorious, that his interest may be affected in his appointments, he becomes responsible to the public for the disgrace or the injury it may sustain from the misconduct of those whom he selects, and invests with commands.—Upon these principles the public have always proceeded. The late ministers were blamed for the folly, or the cowardice, of their commanders in Egypt and in South America; and, why should not these ministers be blamed for the conduct of Wellesley and Sir Hew? As to Sir Hew, I had never heard any harm of him, to be sure; but I had never heard any good of him, because, until the Portuguese expedition, I had never heard his uncouth name pronounced in my whole life. His being utterly unknown to every body, except, perhaps, that silly part of the public, who waste six or eight minutes every day in reading what is called "the court news," was of itself a reason for his not being appointed to the command of an expedition of such immense importance to the country. It is said, with what truth I do not know, that he is a relation of Mr. George Rose. If this be the fact, we need not wonder so much why he was selected. But, be this as it may, the ministers knew him well, or they did not know him well: if the former, they sinned in appointing a man whom they knew to be unfit for a great command; and, if the latter, they sinned in committing the honour of England and the welfare of her allies to the hands of a man, whom they did not well know. It is their business, they are paid well for it, to examine into, to ascertain,



to make themselves sure, as to the character and abilities of those whom they invest with high authority, and on whom they bestow large emoluments. When we complain of the weight of taxes, and of the great sums which public men receive out of the fruit of our labour, we are always reminded of the arduous duties they have to perform and of the weight of responsibility that rests upon their shoulders; and, we are asked, whether any man, possessing great talents and high rank, can be expected to exert those talents for the public and to incur such heavy responsibility, without the security of a suitable compensation. I appeal to the reader, whether this be not, upon such occasions, the argument constantly used. Well, then, if the men, whom we pay at such an enormous rate, and who, if they serve us but for a few years, are saddled upon our devoted ass-like backs for life, accompanied, perhaps, with paniers containing their wives and children; if these men be so wonderfully gifted as to merit all this, have we not a right to expect, and even to demand, at their hands, the selection of proper commanders? Have we not a right to demand proofs of their discriminating powers, of their judgment, and of their firmness in resisting applications, which, if yielded to, would be injurious to us? And, when is it that we are to call upon them for their far-famed "responsibility," if not when we have suffered an injury from the conduct of persons appointed by them? If this be not the true meaning of ministerial responsibility, what is its meaning? If they are to appoint whom they please to command our troops; if they are to commit our honour and our safety to the hands of their own relations, or to those of others who will vote for them in the parliament house, and if, when that honour and that safety have been sacrificed, we are to be told that the ministers are not responsible, I beg leave to be informed of the cases, wherein they acknowledge responsibility.—Wellesley was well-known to them. It is notorious, that he was an intimate with them. I believe he is, even now, one of the principal officers of the government of Ireland. They must have known him well; and, as to their saying, "*who would have thought*" him capable of taking the lead in such a deed as that committed in Portugal, we are not so to be answered: "I should have thought; many others would have thought it; and, at any rate, it was so. That is enough for us." Wellesley was *one of themselves*; chosen from their own body; they had previously committed the government (for his was the really effi-

cient office) of a third part of the kingdom to his hands; they must know his character and every part of his character well, or they were too stupid to be entrusted with the management of the affairs of a parish. And, shall they not now be responsible for his conduct? He was, I repeat it, *one of themselves*. He went out as their immediate representative. Shall they not, then, be answerable for what he has done?—The ultimate consequences of the Convention cannot yet be known; but, we know, that it has filled our allies in Portugal with disgust and indignation, and that these *must* operate to the injury of both nations is certain. We know also, that the sending home of five or six thousand Russian officers and seamen *must* be injurious to Sweden as well as to ourselves. And, as to Spain, we have the strongest reason to believe, that our conduct in Portugal, must excite suspicion and distrust amongst all our allies, more especially amongst those in Spain. There, if our troops are now sent, our commanders will, in all human probability, have little or nothing confided to them. Spain, who looks up to us for assistance of every sort, is just in that state, in which *distrust* is most likely to be fatal. Can any man reasonably hope, that we have not excited distrust of us, by our conduct in Portugal? And, if we have, who will take upon him to say, that, from the date of the Convention, the ruin of the Spanish cause began? We see, that Buonaparté is making great exertions for the reduction of Spain. The people of that country cannot be unaware of the danger. If they distrust us, they will cool in spite of all the toasts at the London Tavern and all the odes of poet Fitzgerald. How different would the feelings of Spain as well as of England have been, at this moment, had we *captured* Junot and his army? In short, if the Spanish patriots should be subdued; if their cause should now begin to be deserted, it may, in great part, be fairly attributed to this Convention. And, shall the people of England call upon no one for responsibility? Shall those, who appointed the commanders, and who had so many persons amongst whom to choose, plead not guilty to this heavy charge?—If Spain fall, let England take care. "*Colonies!*" Napoleon Joseph is not fool, is not ass, is not stupid beast enough to set any value upon them. Give him Spain, and he will very willingly leave in our hands the mines that have hitherto proved a curse to Spain; and will leave us, as a make weight in the bargain, all the feuds, the commotions, the expensive and bloody wars, which would inevitably arise out



[549] of our possession of those colonies. Should Spain fall, is there any man who will say, that that fatal event has not been accelerated by the Convention in Portugal? And shall not the ministers be responsible for the conduct of those who made that convention?—"Why *whom* were they to choose?" Oh, insulted nation! It is not for thee to ask thee whom they were to choose; but for thee to ask them, whether they could not have made a better choice out of a Staff establishment that costs thee nearly a million sterling a year. It was for thee to ask them, whether that Staff, which exceeds in number the whole of the standing army of England in the reign of Charles II, would not afford generals enough for the command of thirty thousand men, without taking one of the ministry of Ireland for the purpose. This is by no means the least mortifying part of the story. We are a nation be-generalled from head to foot. There is scarcely a parish wherein some general does not reside. "The general and his aide-de-camps" make the dust fly from one end of the country to the other; and yet, when we find fault of an appointment of generals, we are asked, "why, whom were the ministers to choose?" We have sent only about a tenth part of our force to Portugal, and if we could not find good commanders for them, what is to become of the rest? "A military nation," indeed! We are a pretty military nation, if, when only a tenth part of our force be sent out, and that, too, upon a service the most important, we are unable to select generals better than those, who made the Convention in Portugal, and when one plea in favour of the ministers, is, that they had not the means of making a better selection.—There has been, as far as the public can perceive, nothing done yet in the way of *recalling*. Nothing has been done; not even the previous steps, have been taken, for the purpose of doing the nation justice. There has dropped from the ministers not one word, tending to shew, that they have a design to do us justice. Their intention appears to be, to let the thing remain quiet; to say nothing and do nothing; to let the public rage exhaust itself, and when it has died away, to smuggle in the commanders, having given them and their friends an abundance of time for the contriving of excuses of all sorts and sizes. This may, very probably, succeed; but, if it should, it will bring with it one source of consolation, at any rate, that, in future, the success of Napoleon will become a matter of indifference.—Remember, reader; always remember,

that, in the Official Gazette, which contained the documents relative to the Convention, the *armistice*, which was the most important of the documents, because it was the basis of all the rest, was inserted in the *French* language only, while all the others were inserted in the *English* language only. It was *Sir Arthur Wellesley* who negotiated and signed the armistice; and, the ministers at home, his colleagues in office, publish that document to the people of England in the *French* language only. One other fact, pray note down and remember; that we pay a man, called "the GAZETTE WRITER," three hundred pounds a year out of the taxes; though, as you must perceive, he has nothing to do but merely to see that publications of this sort are correct. Neither the ministers, nor any of their writers, have attempted to say, that this partial insertion was owing to *mistake*, or to the misconduct of their *underlings*; we have, therefore, a right to conclude, that it was wilful, and to draw, from that fact, the natural inference, which is, that they mean to shelter Wellesley. This, however, they cannot do, unless they shelter Sir Hew. Sir Hew will speak in his own defence, I warrant him; and, he will find, at his back, the same interest that procured him the command. Come, come, then, Sir Hewy, and let us hear you. "Had I three ears I'd hear thee;" but the ministers will, I dare say, take care, that none of us shall hear you for some time yet to come. They will let us *cool* first. Their study, at present, seems to be, not so much to overcome Buonaparté as to overcome us. Instead of the defence of the country, they seem to be thinking of the defence of its generals. Poor Whitelocke, had you no friends at home! What! could you not muster up a single half dozen of hags to rattle over the pavement and intrigue for you? Unfortunate and careless man, not to provide for a safe retreat, in case of disaster! Another time (for there can be now no earthly objection to your being sent out the chief in command) you will, I dare say, profit from the experience now before you, and will, above all things, take care, that *you* negotiate in *French*.—Below will be found two letters upon this subject, which I beg leave to point out to the attention of my readers. The first touches upon some points that had escaped me, and puts several questions, to which I should like to hear an answer given. His praise of my endeavours might have been spared; and, upon a future occasion, if he should think proper to address the public through me, I shall be obliged to



him to refrain from the like, because a plain unvarnished declaration of acquiescence in opinion, and of approbation of my conduct, is better calculated to answer the purpose in view, and is much more gratifying to myself.—The second letter is the vehicle of sentiments precisely the opposite of those contained in the one just mentioned. It evidently comes from a friend, if not relation of Wellesley; and, though, for the greater part, it consists of a repetition of the statements and reasoning, which I have already quoted from the Nabobs' Gazette (commonly called the *Morning Post*), and which I have, I trust, pretty completely refuted, there is a point or two, upon which it touches, that I cannot let pass unnoticed.—The writer appears to be of opinion, that what I have written is likely to produce an effect hostile to his friend, therefore he endeavours to find out for me a motive for misrepresenting his conduct. He says, that my hatred of the Wellesleys for having been the firm friends of the late Mr. Pitt has induced me to disfigure facts in order to injure Sir A. Wellesley in the public opinion. Now, in the first place, I never knew the Wellesleys as adherents of Pitt, that famous talker being, fortunately for the nation, dead before they came flocking home from India, where they had been so long engaged in glorious wars against the native Viziers and Annals. But, how does this imputation tally with the notorious fact? Did I, when the news of the victory, in Portugal, came, seem grudging of my praises of the commander's conduct? Did I not attribute the victory to him alone; and did I not put the victory upon a level, as to its probable consequences, with that of Trafalgar? Should I have done this, if my hatred against the Wellesleys, on account of their attachment to Pitt (or rather to their own selfish views through Pitt) had so completely subdued in my mind all sense of impartiality and of justice. There were two lights, in which the Portuguese victories might have been spoken of; there were two lights, in which Wellesley's dispatches might have been exhibited to the public; and, if I chose that which was, in both cases, most favourable to Wellesley, will the public believe, that I have since been actuated by motives of personal or party hatred? When am I to hear the last of this hatred of mine against the friends of "the late Mr. Pitt?" I can publish no account of speculation, of folly, or of cowardice; I can detect or expose no rascal whatever, but I am instantly accused of being actuated by motives of hatred on account of the party's friendship

for "the late Mr. Pitt." No matter that I publish well-known facts; that I extract from official reports or accounts; that I quote their own speeches or pamphlets; that I prove by the fairest and clearest of arguments: still the answer to me is, not that I have stated falsehoods, not that my reasoning is unsound; but, that I harbour a rancour against the party on account of his attachment to "the late Mr. Pitt." I believe from my soul, that, if, being driven from higher game, one of the speculating gang were to be taken in the act of robbing a hen-roost, or picking a pocket, he would plead in his defence, that his prosecutor was actuated, not by his love of justice, but by his hatred of the offender, on account of that offender's attachment to "the late Mr. Pitt." This is coming to a fine pass, indeed. Why, we shall be told, anon, that the cuckoldom, which has, of late, been, unhappily, so rife amongst the sect, is to be ascribed to the same malicious motive. It is base and silly to talk of party motives in such a case; and, it is always a proof of a bad cause, when the defendant answers the proofs or arguments of the accuser by a mere imputation of malicious motives. I may be a very malicious and implacable man, and I may hate the Wellesleys; but, the question now is, whether, with respect to Portuguese Wellesley's conduct I have reasoned fairly upon acknowledged truths, or not? If the latter, let it be shown; if the former, this writer may be assured, that his client will derive but little advantage from any imputation of motives that his imagination is able to invent.—This writer says, that Wellesley did protest *privately* against the Convention, and, for proof of his assertion, he appeals to the many "private letters that have been received from the army," which private letters I had, as the reader will bear in mind, represented as base fabrications. Now, says this acute gentleman, "you have called them *lies*, but you will find it difficult to make the public believe that so many persons of high honour would have concurred in the statement of what was totally false." So I should; but he forgets, that it has not yet been proved, that any letter from a person of high honour, or that any letter at all, has been received from the army, containing such a statement. Extract upon extract from such described letters have, indeed, been published in many of the news-papers, and particularly in the Nabob's Gazette; but, where have we seen any voucher for their authenticity? Has there appeared one with any name to it?



[553] Has there appeared one with the name of either the writer or the receiver? No: and the man, who, in the letter before me, takes upon him to argue upon the pretended facts contained in those letters; takes upon him to assert that their authors are all persons of high honour; even this man has the prudence not to favour either me or the public with his name. Is it after this fashion that I proceed? Have I dealt in such nameless, unowned, bastard like documents? No: I have taken the official papers, have reasoned from their contents, and have, as premises, resorted to no facts, which are not universally admitted to be true.—By way of conclusion, I will point out a light, in which this pretended protest did not before strike me, and in which it does not appear to have stricken even the editor of the Times news-paper, who has displayed so much acuteness and literary powers of every kind, in the course of this interesting discussion.—The statement of the friends of Wellesley, which statement is, in substance, repeated by my correspondent, is this:—Obedience is the soul of an army; a commander of an army must be as absolute as the Grand Turk; Sir Arthur Wellesley has been brought up in the school of obedience; he knew how great an injury it must be to the service, if he publicly protested against the convention; and, therefore, he confined his opposition to a protest privately made to the commander in chief. This is what they have said in his defence, over and over again, in various forms of words. Now, then, without asking whether the Wellesleys were remarkable for their obedience to the East India Directors, let us put the sincerity of this defence to the test. He protested privately, lest, by a public protest, he should create a division in the army, and thereby do great injury to the service. Now, ye canting hypocrites, if such were the fact and such the motive, how came you in possession of the knowledge of this protest? You are his close friends, perchance, and so he wrote home, unlocking his bosom to you, easing his agonized heart by communicating to you the proof of his innocence? No. This will not do; this will not serve your turn; for, you have told us before, that the facts relating to this protest have been communicated by the officers of the army. So that, taking the whole of your own statement as true; admitting all that you assert, Wellesley, who was convinced that the making of a public protest would be greatly injurious to the service, made a private protest to the commander-in-chief, and then, made an underhand

communication of that protest to the officers of the army. Attempt no shuffle, I beseech you. Let your friend be where he is. You have already besmeared him from head to foot; and, if your efforts at whitewashing are continued much longer, he will come out of your hands as black as a crow.

SPAIN.—Upon the affairs of this now most interesting part of the world there is a letter, written by Major Cartwright, and published in the last number of the Register, to which I beg leave to refer the reader. He will there see how the people of Spain formerly thought and with what spirit they acted, in matters relating to domestic freedom. It is surprising how strong a resemblance there is between what they sought to establish, in the reign of Charles V, and what was established in England a century later. I sincerely wish, that Major Cartwright, who with the experience of three-score, writes with the clearness and the vigour of the prime of life, and whose reasoning and eloquence come recommended by unquestionable disinterestedness and integrity, may succeed in his zealous and unwearied endeavours to rouse the feelings and direct the judgment of the present patriots of Spain.—I am not, nor can any rational man be, without some very serious apprehensions as to the result of the contest that is now about to begin; but, if a provisional government, capable of calling out and directing the force of the country, be speedily organized, I shall have great hopes of final success, notwithstanding any reverses that may, at the out-set, be experienced by the Spaniards. For, we seldom have heard of a whole people being subdued, if they were animated with one soul, and if that soul was bent upon obtaining freedom. The thing to be most feared is, that this all-powerful motive may not universally prevail; that the nobles, or the priests, or both, may look beyond the immediate object of the struggle, and may be grudging in their offers to the people, and also in point of confidence in their intercourse with them. If this should unhappily be the case; if the people should be treated with coolness, disgust will speedily succeed, the cause will soon fall to ruin, and those attacks, which in the other case, would have called forth the latent fire of patriotism, talent, and valour, will at once, extinguish every motive of resistance. It is quite shocking to think of an ancient nation consisting of so many millions of people being made over to, and taken possession of by, a man who was, but yesterday, a person unknown in the world; but, he comes backed with



terrible power, and to resist that power there must be a motive, and an adequate motive too.—In speaking of the operations of the war, the Fabian example of the Americans has been cited. But, we should bear in mind the vast difference in the circumstances. The nature of the two countries is, in the first place, very different. America was assailed by an enemy, who had all his troops, his horses, and his artillery, to send across the sea, a distance of, at least, a thousand leagues, and, it sometimes happened, that five or six months elapsed between the embarkation and the landing. Besides, the enemy whom America had to resist was of a very different character. We used no *fire*; we sacked no towns; we did not carry the torch in one hand and the sword in the other. Our generals were not Massenas and Junots. A standing toast at our head-quarters used to be, “a long war and a merciful one.” The Lanneses do not give such toasts. No: the Spaniards will want men very different from the Washingtons and the Lees. They will have to fight day after day and every day, and to withstand that terror, which the destructive progress of an army, accustomed to pillage and to all sorts of cruelty, cannot fail to inspire in the minds of the weaker part of the nation.—We must not, therefore, conclude, that the Spaniards will succeed, because the Americans did. If, indeed, we could prevail upon Buonaparte to send against them such generals as we sent to America (and *we* might be able, perhaps, to point out *some such* for the service), the Spanish cause would be safe; but, as things are, it must be confessed, that the struggle is an object of the utmost anxiety; and, it behoves us to think betimes of what *our* measures ought to be, if the result should seat a Buonaparte upon the throne.—I like not, I must confess, the seeming hankering after FERDINAND VII. The Spaniards have declared the late government to have been an infamous one. What sense is there, then, in their talk about a man, in whose person they must intend (if they intend to do any thing with him) to restore that government? I do not understand this. He has abdicated the throne; he has given up his claims to the sovereignty of Spain, in terms as explicit as a man can possibly use. There appears to be something like infatuation in carrying on a bloody war for him, or in making his restoration any part of the objects of such a war. This is, with me, a chilling circumstance. It takes largely from the ardour I should feel in the Spanish cause; for, after all, it is the good of the world in general and of Spain and of

England in particular that one ought to have at heart. I observe, that, in several of our writers, a *hatred of Napoleon* is the predominant feeling; and, what is the worst of it, the far greater part of them do not discover hatred of him in his character of *despot*, but in his character of *conqueror*. Now, it is, I presume, in the former character, that he is the most decidedly entitled to *our* hatred; but, then, the difficulty is, that there are *other* despots, whom we profess not to hate at all. We ourselves have been great conquerors in our day. There are the Nabob Viziers, the Nizams, the Sultans, and a long list of sovereigns of one sort and another, whom we have conquered, whose territories we have invaded, and whose subjects we have taken to ourselves, not forgetting some small portion of their *property*; and we have seen, that, instead of curses upon the head of the divers conquerors, we have heaped thanks, praises unbounded, and pensions and titles not a few. Come, come, then; let us not be so unjust as to hate and execrate this man in his character of conqueror. In his character of despot, with all my soul; in his character of despot-maker; in his character of ally of Russia of the rabble of rascals upon the Rhine; in this character I agree to him as much as any man living.—If we hate him as a despot, we cannot wish to see a despotism, of any sort re-established in Spain. The name of the man who is to be at the head of the despotism, if a despotism it is to be, is of no consequence to the Spaniards, nor is of but very little consequence to us. People have often carried on bloody wars for a choice of despots; but, then, each despot was present and active himself. In short, it is absurd to suppose, that, at this day, any nation will undergo fire and sword for the sake of an absent person, whose former government they have called infamous; and, if this absurdity should be attempted to be persevered in, I think, it is very clear, that the Spaniards will be subdued.—This, it seems to me, is the point, upon which the fate of Spain will turn. Uncommon, unheard-of, exertions are required; new courage, new talents, new genius, are demanded. To call these forth powerful motives must exist, and these motives must make their way, at once, to the hearts of even the lowest orders of the people. A choice of despots; a mere choice of persons to whom the people are to be slaves, appears to me to be no motive at all; and hence I conclude, that, if the leaders in Spain persevere in professing to make war for the restoration of their former



despot, they will be defeated, and that Joseph Napoleon, though the son of a green-grocer, will stand at the head of their new family sovereigns. God forbid that this should be the case; but, if the struggle be made for no better purpose, the failure of the Spaniards will be a subject of regret with those only, whose fears of the conqueror have deprived them of the power of reflection.

*Botley, 6th October, 1808.*

# CONVENTIONS IN PORTUGAL.

SIR;—Ought the firing of the Park and Tower guns to be considered as a signal of joy or of grief, Mr. Cobbett?—Ought they ever to be fired, or can they be so, without an express order from the ministers? And when the public do hear these guns, are they bound to conclude that ministers see cause for rejoicing; that they are thus informed of the arrival of some glorious news; and that the firing of the guns is the means by which the ministers intend to convey to the people their own joy and exultation at the happy tidings they have received?—Is nine o'clock at night an unusual hour for these guns to be fired?—And if unusual, is it reasonable for the people to expect news unusually good and glorious?—In such a case is it natural to be unusually anxious, and impatient for the Gazette?—The next question I would beg leave to ask you, Mr. Cobbett, is this—Who is Sir Hew Dalrymple? This is a question I have in vain asked of all I am acquainted with, and I fear it is a question which will puzzle all the big wigs in this kingdom. There is no doubt, however, but that Junot and Kellermann could answer it. Sir Hew's name became immortal (to mention *no one else* at present) on the memorable 30th of Aug. last; a day which never can be forgotten. Who can wish to know more of Sir Hew? Read his Convention. Is that not enough?—Is it the Commander-in-Chief, or the ministers who appoint, or ought to appoint the general, who is to act in the important situation of commander of 30,000 men; and to have the sole and entire disposal of so large and fine an army as the British forces in Portugal?—Are those who do appoint in such a case *responsible*, entirely, or in any degree, for the conduct of him whom they have appointed? If they are not responsible for his acts, who is? and to whom are the people to look for redress?—In selecting a general fit for a duty of so high, so important, and so honourable a nature, in the execution of which, the interests of the country at large, and the honour of Great Britain, are so intimately

connected, should very great circumspection, much consideration, and infinite care and anxiety be shewn?—If that be so, and when a commander-in-chief of such an army is appointed, ought not his character to be perfectly well known, and his name quite familiar to the public? Should they not also be familiar with his former glory and exploits, with his talents, his vigour, his enterprise, and his prudence? Above all, ought not the army to be, (that is the soldiers) very well acquainted with him? Ought they not to have a confidence in him? Ought they not to feel that he is able to command them?—Was there ever an occasion, when all these things should have been more particularly attended to than in selecting a general to command our brave troops in Portugal? Was it not upon the success of the first blow we were to strike in this glorious contest, that almost every thing depended? If it failed, and failed through dishonour and baseness, what could we expect? Had we a right any longer to look for trust or confidence on the Continent? Could the brave people in whose cause we were fighting look upon our *military* assistance, but with mistrust and apprehension? In effect, they might say “*Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*”—I now come, Mr. Cobbett, to a very important part of the subject, and one which, at the present moment, occupies no small share of public attention; I mean the question with respect to Sir Hew and Sir Arthur, which I think will resolve itself into this: either that Sir Arthur is *completely innocent*, or infinitely more guilty than Sir Hew Dalrymple. Let us inquire the *truth*.—Was the actual command taken from Sir Arthur the *instant* that the battle of Vimeira had terminated? And if so, by whom was it taken? Certainly not by Sir Hew, for his own dispatch declares the contrary, and begins thus: “I have the honour to inform your lordship, that I landed in Portugal, and took the command of the army, on Monday the 22d of Aug. the *next day after* the battle of Vimeira.” Now, then, we have the fact that Sir Hew only landed on the 22d. Who therefore had the command of our army, our *victorious* army, from the actual termination of hostilities on the 21st till the arrival at Cintra of Sir Hew on the 22d? And what was done during that period? Upon the answer to these questions the whole will turn. Till we hear the contrary, we are bound to believe that Sir Arthur retained the command. I will, therefore ask, *what was Sir Arthur doing?* How was his



army employed, during that most important interval? His friends say, that he was *burning to push on*. Was he so? That precious interval then, *was so employed*? Did he, then, after his splendid victory, and without *losing an instant*, give orders for the troops following up their well carried success, by immediate pursuit? Did he *prove* that he was "burning to push on?" Did he *instantly* march towards Lisbon in order to *cut off the retreat* of the vanquished Junot (I beg his grace's pardon, I mean le Duc D'Abrantes) and in order to prevent the possibility of his concentrating his force in strong positions? Was, or was not, all or any of these things done? Was that very precious interval in *any way* made use of? —I have *not* asserted that Sir Arthur *did* have the command during this period, but as we *know* that Sir Hew had *not*, it remains to be shewn whether upon this occasion the culprit was Sir Arthur, or Sir Harry. On the head of one or the other of these two, will fall the whole consequences resulting from the inactivity, or want of decision and promptness which then took place, which must have prevented our gallant army from intercepting the French from Lisbon, and from following up the decisive blow which had been struck. The not having done which, and the not having intercepted the French from Lisbon, are allowed to be the only reasons why any Convention became necessary, (or rather was *thought necessary*) he therefore, (be he who he may) the man who produced this state of things, whose scandalous conduct rendered such a humiliating alternative necessary, is *far more guilty* than the man who *merely ratified* the damned agreement. —Whilst I am always for permitting fully "*Palnam qui meruit ferat*," at the same time I am equally desirous that *Culpam qui meruit ferat*. And grieved as I should be to blast the fresh laurels on the victorious brow of Sir Arthur, still, justice, and the injured honour of this country, require, that the culprit, be he who he may, should be openly dragged forth to public view and to public investigation. We have already seen that there *must have been* most criminal conduct somewhere between the 21st and the 22d, that Sir Hew is completely out of that scrape, and that it is entirely between Sir Harry and Sir Arthur. Now let us suppose that Sir Harry, notwithstanding his generosity on the field of battle, did however supersede Sir Arthur the moment that the French began to retreat; and let us suppose that Sir Arthur's advice was rejected —then, on the following day, the 22d, Sir Hew arrives, and takes the com-

mand from Sir Harry, and then, as his dispatch says, "*a few hours after my arrival*, General Kellermann came in with a "flag of truce," &c. and immediately after —"The inclosed contains the several articles "*at first agreed upon and signed by Sir Arthur Wellesley and General Kellermann*." —Pray how were these articles *agreed upon* and signed by Sir Arthur, whom we have supposed to have had no command since the termination of the battle of Vimeira? Are we to suppose, that Sir Hew *requested* Sir Arthur, as being conversant with the then state of affairs, to enter into some terms of agreement; and are we to suppose that he was left entirely to his own judgment and discretion? Or, are we to suppose that on being so requested, he strongly urged to Sir Hew, the *fatal* consequences to be dreaded from any suspension of hostilities, that he implored him to listen to nothing short of unconditional surrender, and that he did every thing in his power to prevent any Convention from being acceded to? —That Sir Hew then *commanded* him to sign that which his heart revolted at? Are we to suppose this? —And are we then to suppose that tamely and tacitly, with much gentle resignation, the gallant Sir Arthur obeyed the detested order? —Now which of these two, is the most probable case? The former which supposes him to be only requested, and left to act according to *his own judgment*; or the latter in which he is *harshly commanded* and left without a particle of discretionary power? Is it not on this, that the whole merit or demerit of his conduct as to the *signature* rests? —But I will now ask you, Mr. Cobbett, whether *you* would consider the *request* of a commander-in-chief as tantamount to a *command*? Next, whether a command even, should always, and without exception, be implicitly and tacitly *obeyed*? —Should the command of a superior in *no instance* be departed from? Is there *no latitude* in *any case* allowed? And supposing all these to be answered by declaring that nothing but passive and implicit obedience, can be tolerated by the military law, I would ask you, are there *no situations* in which it would be both honourable and even noble to disobey an express command? And if it might be honourable and even noble in some situations to disobey a command, might there not also be circumstances under which it would be both *criminal and base* to obey an express command? Indeed, your last Register has already declared your opinion on this subject. If any one insisted on this meek, humble, non-resisting obedience, as being *indispensable* according to



the military law, I would beg to know where such womanish obedience could stop. For instance: when Kellermann was fairly about it, stipulating on the one hand, and getting *every stipulation* as quickly agreed to on the other—no matter how framed or how worded—why did it not occur to him, to stipulate that the duke his master, with the whole of the French army, artillery, &c. should be immediately conveyed in English transports to the coast of Ireland, (a frigate or 74 being provided for his *grace*) and there be disembarked with all their baggage, plunder, &c. &c. and be supplied with *sixty rounds* per man and gun? Why did this not occur to him? Of course it would have been agreed to, and by the convenient non-resisting rule of obedience, the *victorious Sir Arthur* would, good pliant soul, have put his hand, when *so required*, to such a stipulation!!! Having so done, he might then have resumed his situation as commander-in-chief in Ireland with *great éclat*—and with “No Popery” as his watch-word, have had the infinite satisfaction of again encountering his Portuguese antagonists on British ground. Indeed he might, in that case, possibly, have beheld, the *imperial flag*, of “his *imperial and royal majesty Napoleon I.*” waving over the turrets of Dublin castle! And his *grace* of Abrantes might have then *himself become an emperor, a catholic emperor*. Strange that all this did not occur to Kellermann; whose fertile and comprehensive mind seems to have been always “*utrumque paratus*.”—Since writing the above, a most *unfortunate letter* of Sir Arthur’s has made its appearance before the public, in which (*mirabile dictu!*) he even *congratulates* the Portuguese on the Convention, in which he sees “*NOTHING REMARKABLE*”!!! Gracious God! Can the conqueror of Vimeira think so?—As to the conduct of ministers on this occasion, I think we have yet no reason to doubt, that they will act with the same vigour and promptitude, which, happily for this country, has already marked their career. It is but doing them justice to say, that as a whole (however much I may object to certain component parts) they have done more, and with more spirit, in their short reign, than any administration, which I can recollect, to have done in the same period.—The *firing of the guns* ought to be accounted for!—I cannot entirely dismiss this subject without taking notice of what you have written, Mr. Cobbett, respecting it. And although that damned Convention in Portugal, which can never cease to be thought of with curses and execrations by every Englishman, and all

that is any way connected with it, fires me with indignation, and chills me with horror at the bare recollection, still, notwithstanding this, I have been able to read your excellent account of the ignominious transactions in that quarter with some degree of pleasure and satisfaction; a melancholy pleasure indeed and a mournful satisfaction! Your plain, but nervous language; your unbiassed, but manly conclusions; your just, but ardent colouring, give to the whole of your statement a tone and character, which cannot fail, even to the remotest times, to make every true Briton’s heart bleed within him when he peruses it—whilst at those honest bursts of indignation, which it here and there exhibits, he will be roused to madness; will feel his whole soul on fire, and will call down curses and vengeance on those who were the authors of his poor country’s disgrace and ignominy. To have *all the circumstances which preceded this fatal Convention* (at which name “*horresco referens*”) fairly detailed, and recorded in clear and unambiguous language, was fit, was necessary. Every one who has read your last week’s Register, will, if they do you justice, readily admit, that few could have executed this *so well, and none, I am sure, better*.—I am always, Sir,—P. C.

#### CONVENTIONS IN PORTUGAL.

SIR,—Amidst the burst of general and violent indignation, which is so universally felt by the whole nation, at the termination of the campaign in Portugal, and in which you so largely participate; permit me to point out some circumstances, which have been either designedly or inadvertently overlooked. All the public writers have poured out the most virulent invectives against every part of the Conventions, without once advertent to the very important advantages which have been gained. This is not just. I am not, Mr. Cobbett, about to defend the conventions; I think with you that they are highly disgraceful, to those in particular who concluded them, and, also, to the nation at large, as far as it can be considered as a party to them. But, let us not shut our eyes to the services which *have* been performed; let not a blind and inconsiderate passion, hurry us on to deprive ourselves of the consolation of thinking, at least, that something really essential has been effected. We certainly had a just right to expect the absolute surrender of the French army. The general atrocity which has marked the conduct of the French in every part of Europe, and in Portugal in particular, together with the victories of Sir Arthur Wellesley, de-



manded a different result. But after all, will you say that nothing *has* been gained? Is getting the French army out of Portugal, even at *any* rate, *nothing*? Is neutralizing the Russian fleet *nothing*? Is enabling our army to act in Spain, without an enemy in its rear, *nothing*? Is not the Corsican usurper, preparing an immense force, with which he hopes to overwhelm the Spaniards? And, was it not of the utmost consequence, that our army should be free of the enemy in Portugal as soon as possible, that it might be enabled to give effectual and timely assistance to Spain? These appear to me to be great and important advantages; and, notwithstanding they cannot be put in competition with those which we have lost, yet, they are not to be overlooked and considered as nothing. A most objectionable part of the convention seems to be, suffering the French army to carry off its ill gotten plunder; this is unpardonable, and demands the severest reprehension; for, independent of the sanction which is thereby given to robberies the most atrocious, it must have an effect on the Portuguese highly inimical to this nation. They will consider themselves as sacrificed by us, and, we shall also, I fear, be identified with robbers and thieves. Surely a severe and rigid scrutiny will be made into this matter; the honour and character of the army, as well as the wounded feelings of the people require it. You have treated this subject, Mr. Cobbett, with your usual ingenuity; yet I cannot but think, that you have suffered your zeal to outrun your discretion. You undoubtedly feel highly indignant on this occasion, as every true Englishman must, who feels for the honour of his country; but yet, let justice be done. In order to render the transaction as odious as possible, you decry Lisbon, as a place of strength, and, think, that if Junot had chosen to defend himself in that place, it would not have been any material obstruction to the march of the army to assist the Spaniards. You, Mr. Cobbett, ought to understand these matters better than I do, having, to your praise be it spoken, had military experience; but, have you ever seen Lisbon? have you examined its forts? its fortifications and means of defence? and, if you have not, how can you speak so positively of its weakness? of the facility with which it might have been taken? and assert that there are "no grounds for believing, that the siege could have lasted for a week?" If our general had been of the same opinion, it cannot be believed that he would have signed such a convention. You say, that you never heard of any strong

places in Portugal. Will it be denied that Lisbon possesses some strong places? Are there not forts, which have effectually prevented our fleet from entering the Tagus? And, can it be possible, that a place of such vast importance as Lisbon should be without the means of resisting an enemy for a considerable time? Your position that Junot entered the place without any trouble will avail you nothing, for the Portuguese never even *attempted* to defend it, and it fell an unresisting prey to the lawless invader. Very different, I apprehend, would have been the case, if the French had determined on defending it, and the utmost efforts and skill of our brave army would probably have been baffled for some weeks; and, what at the present moment is of the utmost consequence, been also prevented from giving that prompt and timely assistance to the Spaniards, which the noble cause they are embarked in so imperiously demands. This circumstance carries conviction to my mind, that the measure of obliging the French to evacuate Portugal speedily, even at *any* rate, was a measure of the most urgent necessity, and may ultimately be of the utmost importance to the general cause. I therefore am convinced, that three objects of the greatest consequence have been obtained; viz. clearing Portugal of the French; neutralizing the Russian fleet; and enabling our army to march into Spain, without an enemy in its rear. These are facts and cannot be controverted; and, although I am particularly anxious to impress you with an idea of their importance; yet, I do not bring them forward, as any defence of the conventions; but, merely, as some alleviation of the great disappointment which the public has experienced, and to prove that amidst much evil, *some* good has been obtained.—I am very sorry to see that your hatred to the Wellesleys, as having been the firm friends of the late Mr. Pitt, has carried you the length of stigmatizing Sir Arthur Wellesley, as the author of the conventions, and of giving a false colouring to the transaction. You have employed many words and much sophistry to accomplish this. But let us, Sir, clear away the rubbish and attend only to facts. I apprehend, the grand main spring, which regulates and directs the operations of an army, to be obedience. Every thing resolves itself into this. Every officer is bound strictly to obey the commands of his superior in every thing connected with the army. Obedience is the very life and soul of an army, and without which it would be a mere shadow, a thing of no value. We have only to look at the armies of the Grand Turk,



to be convinced of the truth of this position. This, Sir, is so positive a truth, that you cannot deny it; you *must* allow it me; and on that ground I mean to shew the futility of your arguments. Sir Arthur Wellesley, on the 21st of August, gains a victory over the French army, in which even *you* have not attempted to deprive him of the merit of having, with a part of his force, defeated double the numbers. During the engagement, Sir Harry Burrard (his superior officer, observe) arrives; the instant he joined the army, Sir Arthur's command was virtually at an end. Now, mark; Sir Harry Burrard says, that he found Sir Arthur's dispositions so excellent, that he had no occasion to alter them, (or words to that effect) which is explicitly declaring, that he *did* possess the power, if he had had the inclination, thereby declaring himself, what he actually was, the superior officer; nay, even the dispatches were written to lord Castlereagh by Sir Harry Burrard in that capacity. If, therefore, my position of obedience is correct, Sir Arthur's responsibility was actually at an end, on the 21st; he had no longer the command of the forces; he had no longer a will of his own; but was positively bound to obey the orders of Sir Harry Burrard. We are also informed that numerous letters from some of the most distinguished officers in the British army, agree in stating, that "Sir Arthur Wellesley most distinctly declared his opinion, that, the expediency of permitting the French to capitulate at all, was occasioned *solely* by the dilemma into which the army had been brought by its being prevented contrary to his plans and wishes *repeatedly* urged, from following up the victory of the 21st, in which case the whole of the French army *must inevitably* have been destroyed, instead of being enabled by that fatal delay to retreat to the passes, and to concentrate themselves in forts in their rear, which it might consume the whole of the winter months to beat them out of." You then triumphantly ask, "who stopped Wellesley?" I answer, Sir, Harry Burrard. The moment the battle was over, Sir Arthur could not possibly act for himself; he had nothing to do, but to obey Sir Harry Burrard, his superior officer; and, on him, in my opinion, the whole responsibility rests. It *must* be he who prevented Sir Arthur from pursuing the enemy. Who else had the power? let me ask. I positively say, no one. Sir Hew Dalrymple had nothing to do with it. He did not land till the 24th, and the armistice was signed on the 22d. I have heard from very good

authority, that the ministers are satisfied with Sir Hew Dalrymple's conduct; and, say that he could not have acted otherwise than he did. What they say, and think of Sir Harry Burrard, is another matter. In order to complete your plan, of throwing all the odium on Sir Arthur Wellesley, you affect to discredit the numerous letters which are said to have been received from some of the most distinguished officers in the British army, and assert them to be lies. You must produce very strong and sufficient evidence of this assertion, before you can expect it to be given credit to. I cannot think, Mr. Cobbett, that you think so yourself; for you *must* know, that, when *numerous letters* from men of character and high honour, *all agree* on the same subject, that it *must* be a fact; and these letters will and ought to obtain credit, amongst that part of mankind, who will not suffer their understanding to be overpowered by any sophistry however ingenious, or with a cloud of words. The very circumstances of the case furnish strong presumptive evidence of their truth. It must occur to every one, that the defeat of the French should have been instantly followed up, by detaching that part of the army which had suffered least, in order to cut off the retreat of the flying enemy; and I firmly believe, from the knowledge we have of the vigour and capacity of Sir Arthur Wellesley, that had he not been prevented by a superior power, it would have been done, and the disgraceful conventions prevented.—I am always concerned Mr. Cobbett, to have occasion to differ in opinion with you, for I greatly admire your talents; but even Homer sometimes nods: and if I ever take the liberty of stating my sentiments in opposition to yours, I trust that you will receive them with kindness.—OBSERVER.—Sept. 27th, 1808.

## OFFICIAL PAPERS.

CONVENTIONS IN PORTUGAL.—*From the London Gazette Extraordinary, continued from page 544.*

VIII. The garrison of Elvas, and its forts, and of Peniche and Palmela, will be embarked at Lisbon: that of Alameda at Oporto, or the nearest harbour. They will be accompanied on their march by British commissaries charged with providing for their subsistence and accommodation.—IX. All the sick and wounded who cannot be embarked with the troops are entrusted to the British army. They are to be taken care of whilst they remain in this country, at the expense of the British government under the condition of the same being reimbursed by France when



the final evacuation is effected. The English government will provide for their return to France, which shall take place by detachments of about one hundred and fifty or two hundred men at a time. A sufficient number of French medical officers shall be left behind to attend them.—X. As soon as the vessels employed to carry the army to France shall have disembarked it in the harbours specified, or in any other of the ports of France to which stress of weather may force them, every facility shall be given them to return to England without delay, and security against capture until their arrival in a friendly port.—XI. The French army shall be concentrated in Lisbon, and within a distance of about two leagues from it. The English army will approach within three leagues of the capital, and will be so placed as to leave about one league between the two armies.—XII. The forts of St. Julien, the Bugio, and Cascais shall be occupied by the British troops on the ratification of the convention. Lisbon and its citadel, together with the forts and batteries, as far as the Lazaretto or Trofuria on one side, and fort St. Joseph on the other, inclusively, shall be given up on the embarkation of the second division, as shall also the harbour and all armed vessels in it of every description, with their rigging, sails, stores, and ammunition. The fortresses of Elvas, Almada, Peniche, and Palmela, shall be given up, as soon as the British troops can arrive to occupy them. In the meantime the general in chief of the British army will give notice of the present convention to the garrisons of those places, as also to the troops before them, in order to put a stop to all further hostilities.—XIII. Commissaries shall be named on both sides, to regulate and accelerate the execution of the arrangements agreed upon.—XIV. Should there arise doubts as to the meaning of any article, it will be explained favourably to the French army.—XV. From the date of the ratification of the present convention, all arrears of contributions, requisitions, or claims whatever, of the French government, against subjects of Portugal, or any other individuals residing in this country, founded on the occupation of Portugal by the French troops in the month of Dec. 1807, which may not have been paid up, are cancelled, and all sequestrations laid upon their property moveable or immoveable, are removed, and the free disposal of the same is restored to the proper owners.—XVI. All subjects of France, or of powers in friendship or alliance with France, domiciliated in Portugal, or accidentally in this country, shall be pro-

tected. Their property of every kind, moveable and immoveable, shall be respected, and they shall be at liberty either to accompany the French army, or to remain in Portugal. In either case their property is guaranteed to them, with the liberty of retaining or disposing of it, and passing the produce of the sale thereof into France, or any other country where they may fix their residence, the space of one year being allowed them for that purpose.—It is fully understood that shipping is excepted from this arrangement, only, however, in so far as regards leaving the port; and that none of the stipulations above-mentioned can be made the pretext of any commercial speculation.—XVII. No native of Portugal shall be rendered accountable for his political conduct during the period of the occupation of the country by the French army; and all those who have continued in the exercise of their employments, or who have accepted situations under the French government, are placed under the protection of the British commanders: they shall sustain no injury in their persons or property, it not having been at their option to be obedient or not to the French government; they are also at liberty to avail themselves of the stipulations of the 16th article.—XVIII. The Spanish troops, detained on board ship in the port of Lisbon, shall be given up to the commander-in-chief of the British army, who engages to obtain of the Spaniards to restore such French subjects, either military or civil, as may have been detained in Spain without being taken in battle, or in consequence of military operations, but on occasion of the occurrences of the 29th of last May, and the days immediately following.—XIX. There shall be an immediate exchange established for all ranks of prisoners made in Portugal since the commencement of the present hostilities.—XX. Hostages of the rank of field-officers shall be mutually furnished on the part of the British army and navy, and on that of the French army, for the reciprocal guarantee of the present convention. The officers of the British army shall be restored on the completion of the articles which concern the army; and the officers of the navy on the disembarkation of the French troops in their own country. The like is to take place on the part of the French army.—XXI. It shall be allowed to the general in chief of the French army to send an officer to France with intelligence of the present convention. A vessel will be furnished by the British admiral to convey him to Bourdeaux and Rochefort.—XXII. The British admiral will be invited

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to accommodate his excellency the commander-in-chief, and the other principal officers of the French army, on board of ships of war.—Done and concluded at Lisbon this 30th day of August, 1808. (Signed) GEORGE MURRAY, quarter-master-general. KELLERMANN, le général de division.

Nous Duc D'Abrantes, général en chef de l'armée Française, avons ratifié et ratifions la présente convention définitive dans tous ses articles, pour être exécuté selon sa forme et teneur. (Signé) LE DUC D'ABRANTES. — Au quartier général de Lisbonne, le 30 Août.

*Additional Articles to the Convention of August 30.*

Art. I. The individuals in the civilemployment of the army, made prisoners, either by the British troops, or by the Portuguese, in any part of Portugal, will be restored as is customary, without exchange.—II. The French army shall be subsisted from its own magazines, up to the day of embarkation; the garrisons up to the day of evacuation of the fortresses. The remainder of the magazines shall be delivered over in the usual form to the British government, which charges itself with the subsistence of the men and horses of the army from the above-mentioned periods, till their arrival in France, under the condition of their being reimbursed by the French government for the excess of the expense beyond the estimation to be made by both parties, of the value of the magazines delivered up to the British army.—The provisions on board the ships of war in possession of the French army, will be taken on account by the British government, in like manner with the magazines in the fortresses.—III. The general commanding the British troops will take the necessary measures for re-establishing the free circulation of the means of subsistence between the country and the capital.—Done and concluded at Lisbon, this 30th day of August, 1808. (Signed) GEORGE MURRAY, quarter-master-general. KELLERMANN, le général de division.

Nous Duc D'Abrantes, général en chef de l'armée Française, avons ratifié et ratifions les articles additionnels à la convention et entre pour être exécutés suivant leur forme et teneur.—LE DUC D'ABRANTES.—(A true copy.) A. J. DALRYMPLE, captain, military secretary.

*Admiralty Office, Sept. 16, 1808.*

Captain Halsted, first captain to the squadron under the command of Admiral Charles Cotton, Bart. commander-in-chief of his majesty's ships and vessels on the coast of Portugal, arrived yesterday at

this office, with dispatches from the admiral to the hon. Wellesley Pole, of which the following are copies:

*Hibernia, off the Tagus, Sept. 3, 1808.*

Sir,—Inclosed herewith, for the information of the lords commissioners of the admiralty, is a copy of a convention,\* entered into by lieut. col. Murray, and gen. Kellermann, for the evacuation of Portugal by the French army; such convention having been ratified by lieut. gen. sir Hew Dalrymple, myself, and the French commander-in-chief. British troops, consisting of the 3d and 42d regiments, were on the 2d instant landed, to occupy the forts of Cascais, St. Antonio, St. Julien, and the Bugio, and no time shall be lost to embark the French troops, agreeably to the said convention.—Captain Halsted, first captain of this ship, and captain of the fleet, who is now the bearer of dispatches to their lordships, respecting the Russian squadron in the Tagus, is in full possession of my confidence, and will be able to explain to their lordships the motives inducing me to ratify the convention in question, as well as give any further information that may be thought necessary.—I have, &c. (Signed) CHARLES COTTON.

\* A copy of the convention inclosed in the letter from sir Hew Dalrymple.

*Hibernia off the Tagus, 4th Sept. 1808.*

Sir,—Herewith I have the honour to inclose to you, for the information of the lords commissioners of the admiralty, a copy of a convention entered into by me with vice admiral Seniavin, commanding the Russian fleet in the Tagus; by which it will appear to their lordships, that such fleet has been surrendered to me, to be held by his majesty as a deposit, until six months after the conclusion of a peace between Russia and England.—I have charged captain Halsted, first captain of the *Hibernia*, and captain of the fleet, with the delivery of this dispatch to their lordships: he was sent by me to negotiate the convention with vice admiral Seniavin, and will be able to explain every particular. To capt. Halsted I feel greatly indebted for his able advice and assistance upon all points of service; his zeal and diligence have been exemplary, and entitle him to my highest commendation.—Rear-admiral Tyler has been directed to superintend the first division of the Russian fleet, which I purpose ordering under his protection immediately to Spithead: to him (since with me) I have been indebted for every assistance, and to the captains, officers, and crews of those ships, that have been employed throughout a tediously protracted



blockade (by whom every exertion has been made with a degree of cheerfulness doing them infinite honour,) I feel extremely grateful, and deem it my duty to offer every possible testimony of my approbation in their favour.—I have, &c. (Signed) C. COTTON.

*Articles of a Convention entered into between Vice Admiral Seniavin, Knight of the Order of St. Alexander, and other Russian Orders, and Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, Bart. for the Surrender of the Russian Fleet, now anchored in the River Tagus.*

Art I. The ships of war of the emperor of Russia now in the Tagus as specified in the annexed list, shall be delivered up to admiral sir C. Cotton, immediately, with all their stores as they now are, to be sent to England, and there held as a deposit by his Britannic majesty, to be restored to his imperial majesty, within six months after the conclusion of a peace between his Britannic majesty, and his imperial majesty the emperor of all the Russias.—II. Vice-admiral Seniavin, with the officers, sailors, and marines, under his command, to return to Russia without any condition or stipulation respecting their future services; to be conveyed there in men of war, or proper vessels at the expence of his Britannic majesty.—Done and concluded on board the ship Twerday, in the Tagus, and on board his Britannic majesty's ship Hibernia, off the mouth of that river, the 3d day of Sept. 1808. (Signed) DE SENIAVIN. CHARLES COTTON. (Counter-signed by command of the admiral), L. SASS, assesseur de college. (Counter-signed by command of the admiral), JAMES KENNEDY, secretary.

*Lists of the Ships referred to in the foregoing Convention.*

Twerday, vice-admiral Seniavin, captain du 1st rang Melayoff, of 74 guns, and 736 men.—Skoroy, captain du 1st rang Schelling, of 60 guns, and 524 men.—Ste. Helene, captain du 2d rang Bitchenscoy, of 74 guns and 598 men.—S. Cofael, captain du 2d rang Roshnoff, of 74 guns, and 610 men.—Ratvizan, captain du 2d rang Rtishchoff, of 66 guns, and 549 men.—Silnoy, capt. lieut. Malygruin, of 74 guns, and 604 men.—Motchnoy, capt. lieut. Rasvosoff, of 74 guns, and 529 men.—Rafael, capt. lieut. Bytchenskoy, of 80 guns, and 646 men.—Fregatte Kilduyn, capt. lieut. Dournoff, of 26 guns, and 222 men.—Yarowslaval, captain du 5d rang Milkoff, of 74 guns, and 567 men. Total 5685 men. (Signed) MALIVJEFF, le capitaine de Pavillon.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.—(Continued from page 486).—*Victories in Saragossa. From the Oviedo Gazette Extraordinary, Aug. 23, 1808.*

Saragossa, a town which we cannot mention without the most lively emotion, has completely humbled to the dust the lofty eagles of the French. The arms of the French did not find there an Ulm, but a St. Jean d'Acre. Let us, therefore, contribute to preserve the memory thereof, by publishing the following official papers and manifestoes:—

Most Serene Sir,—The enemy, after so many obstinate and fruitless attacks on this city, renewed the bombardment on the 3d and 4th instant, throwing a great number of bombs into the place, and doing considerable damage. On the 4th, without discontinuing the bombardment, they attacked with twelve pieces of cannon, one of our batteries, and after the most glorious defence, which lasted untill eight o'clock, the enemy carried the battery, and entered the town; yet without getting possession of our artillery, which we saved.—In the neighbouring streets the enemy met with the most vigorous resistance, and the slaughter was so great among them, that the remembrance of this action must at all times prove extremely painful to them. They are confined to a small space which they occupy in the city, and, with the troops which I expect from Valentia, within two days, I hope I shall be able to give a good account of the enemy's corps, whose defeat will administer comfort to the inhabitants, whose intrepid firmness I admire. They will forget their past and present sufferings, and I shall feel perfectly consoled. God preserve your highness many years!—JOSEPH DE PALAFOX Y MELZI. Head quarters, Saragossa, Aug. 10, 1808.

*To the Lord of the Supreme Council of Asturias.*

Most Serene Sir,—I have the satisfaction to inform your highness, that the French army, which for these two months has inflicted the severest sufferings on this city, and whose conduct has been most abominable, fled this morning at break of day, leaving in our possession an immense quantity of artillery, ammunition, provisions, and other effects. During the night, the enemy made a fresh attack within the city, from the small space which he occupied; but he was routed by the valiant defenders of this town, and his defeat was so complete, that he fled with the utmost precipitation.—This very night a division of 4000 excellent troops moved from this place to



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cut off the enemy's retreat through Navarre, where they will be joined by other troops and the armed peasantry of that country; and the 6000 men that I expect to-morrow from Valentia, joined by 4000 men of the army formed on Catalay-ad, will, I trust, be able to overtake the enemy's rear, in order to chastise and prevent them from committing on this march their usual robberies and vexations.—This fortunate event has been this day celebrated with the ringing of bells, and to-morrow the Te Deum will be sung to offer up thanks to the Most High.—It is of great importance to accelerate the meeting of the deputies of all the provinces of Spain, and I think it would be expedient to appoint for that purpose a day in the next month of September. I have given the same advice to the rest of the general and supreme councils in the whole kingdom; and should you coincide with me in opinion on this subject, I hope you will acquaint me with it.—JOSEPH DE PALAFOX Y MELZI. Head-quarters, Saragossa, Aug. 13. 1808. *Manifesto, dated Head-quarters, Saragossa, Aug. 15.*

After so many days of pain and affliction, the period has at length arrived, which I could expect, from the firmness and valour with which you have defended this illustrious capital.—Having witnessed the shameful flight of the French slaves, who have abandoned the artillery, ammunition, and provisions, which their detestable rapacity had heaped up, let us now perform our principal duty, and offer up thanks to the Omnipotent who has inflicted condign punishment on those wretched soldiers who profane the temples, outrage the sacred images of the Divinity; and are such strangers to morality, that they are not worthy to have any intercourse with the rest of mankind. Let us leave their emperor to the remorse and afflictions which are the lot of the wicked, and beseech the Most High, that he may vouchsafe to bless again our arms, that the two armies which are in pursuit of the fugitive robbers, may complete their destruction.—The fields of Saragossa, its gates, and even its streets, are stained by the blood of 6000 Frenchmen, who have paid with their lives for the temerity of their chief. This is the fruit which the French have reaped from their entrance in Arragon. All Europe, nay, the universe, will hear with horror the names of their generals Le Febvre and Verdier, who, unmindful of the good treatment which the French prisoners, and the natives of France experienced in Arragon, have committed the utmost atrocities. They very justly appreciated the difference

between the system of an ambitious and treacherous government, and that of a nation which cements its felicity by the fairest principles of justice, and considers not as real enemies those who took no share in the delicious combat of their government. France will long deplore the calamities which the war with Spain has prepared for her; and cannot recollect, without the deepest sense of shame, the means employed to carry it on.—Husbandmen, artizans, orphans, aged and religious persons, ye who have been reduced to indigence and misery in consequence of your fields being fired, your houses destroyed, and your property, which, however small, constituted your whole fortune and all your comfort, robbed by the French, be easy; you have the good fortune of living in Spain, and yours is the glory to have defended the capital of Arragon, whereby our enemy was prevented from desolating the rest of this beautiful province: you bore up with resignation under your sufferings, and disregarded your private interest in order to promote the general good. I cannot look with indifference on deeds of heroism like yours, nor omit any opportunity of procuring you relief. I have very particularly charged the intendant general of the kingdom, D. Lorenzo Calbo, as soon as the most pressing occupation of the present period shall permit it, to relieve your wants by every means in his power; and I depend on the generous feelings of all Spaniards, and on the liberal sentiments of our beloved king, that all possible exertion will be made to indemnify you for your sufferings and losses.—PALAFOX.

*Manifesto of the Junta of Seville, August 3, 1808.*

The defence of our country, and of our king, that of our laws, our religion, and of all the rights of man, trodden down and violated, in a manner which is without example, by the emperor of the French, Napoleon I. and by his troops in Spain, compelled the whole nation to take up arms, and to chuse itself a form of government; and in the difficulties and dangers into which the French had plunged it, all, or nearly all, the provinces, as it were by the inspiration of heaven, and in a manner little short of miraculous, created supreme juntas, delivered themselves up to their guidance, and placed in their hands the rights and the ultimate fate of Spain.—The effects have hitherto most happily corresponded with the designs of those who formed them. The provinces have armed themselves; some have formed large armies of veteran troops, and have united to them the enlisted peas-



sants; all, or nearly all, have fought and are fighting against the French in behalf of their king, Ferdinand VII. with a valour and a constancy, of which neither Greece, nor Rome, nor any other nation of the world, had any idea. The French are really amazed and terrified, and the hopes of conquering them are as sure as human certainty can reach.—The only thing which can impair or frustrate them, is discord, and the want of union among the provinces themselves. Hence the supreme junta paid its first attention to remove that danger, with which view it printed and published the official paper, entitled *Precautions*, which it communicated in every possible manner to all the provinces of Spain. The bringing this plan to perfection, and carrying it into complete execution, is now more than ever necessary. Our enemies are anxious to foment our divisions. Human passions, personal interests ill-understood, the ignorance, the weakness, the blindness of men, may, perhaps, without their knowing it, assist the evil designs of our enemies, and thus destroy a beginning so glorious, and facilitate and consummate the entire ruin of Spain. This it is that we are endeavouring to guard against, urged only by the most sacred motives, by our honour, by our loyalty as affectionate subjects, by our duty as Spaniards, by our faith as Christians; and here we protest before God and man, whose aid we invoke with all fervency, that we will write nothing but what is dictated to us by the love of our country, the preservation of our king, and of our rights, not mingling with it any thing that appears to partake of passion, of interest, or of any other personal motive; but being always ready to hear the opinions of the other provinces, and to amend our own errors, wherever it shall be shewn that we have committed any.—Be it the chief care to avoid every thing which is not absolutely necessary, and which may serve to sow the seeds of disunion in the provinces, and to excite divisions among them; and of this nature we esteem all conversations about the royal house, and of the order of succession in different families which derive a right from it. There is no person so ignorant of the history of Spain, and of the manner in which the throne has been occupied, as not to know the changes which have taken place in the succession. It is also known what are the legislative proceedings upon this point; what the manner in which endeavours were used to introduce

an alteration into them; the different pretexts for this alteration; and, lastly, the final settlement which was made by the cortes of 1789, and which ought in future to be the rule.—But are we in a situation to talk of these matters? Long live our king and indisputable sovereign Ferdinand VII. and long live his august brothers, heirs of the crown, after his attested decease. Why then anticipate those enquiries which can only be necessary in default of these? This anticipation may produce, by the diversity of opinions which it creates, a cruel disunion, which, of itself alone, will utterly ruin the only aim and object which Spain at present has in view, and that is, its own entire and independent preservation for its sovereign lord and king, Ferdinand VII. and his undisputed successors; and, with its king, the preservation of its own rights and laws, and the unity of the holy Roman Catholic apostolical religion, which it has gloriously professed and defended for so many ages. It is therefore, both absurd and dangerous to dispute about the succession in cases evidently remote; all the provinces of Spain ought to confine themselves in this respect to this general expression—"Hereditary succession according to the fundamental laws of the monarchy."—Not so is it with the second question moved by the various juntas of the kingdom, which certainly keeps the people in a state of disquietude and agitation, is the continual object of public conversation, and may produce divisions fatal to the generous design, and the virtuous obligation into which we have entered of defending ourselves against our enemies, and of preserving our country, our king, our monarchy, our laws, and our religion. This second question is—Is there a necessity for creating a supreme government, which may unite the sovereign authority of all the provinces, till the restitution of king Ferdinand to his throne?—This supreme junta declares openly, that from the beginning to the present time it has been persuaded that such a supreme government is altogether necessary, and that without it the country is in danger, and its enemies will find means of completing its ruin; and the reasons of this determination and declaration are so evident, and present themselves with such clearness to the eyes of all, that they cannot fail of convincing all who have the least notion of public affairs, or a correct insight into the nature of man, the passions which move him, and the order of human affairs in all ages.

(To be continued.)